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ABSTRACT. In this paper I analyze the postmodern condition 
with particular reference to the ethical and political spheres. 
Postmodernism attempts a radical break with all of the major 
strands of post-Enlightenment thought. For postmodernists as 
the French Jean-François Lyotard and the Italian Gianni Vattimo, 
the orthodox Enlightenment “meta-narrative” of progress 
and the “speculative” narrative of Hegel and Marx have lost 
their explanatory force. In particular, Lyotard speaks about 
five large meta-narratives of Western culture: 1) Christianity 
(understood also in the secularized form which its values 
have taken into modernity); 2) Enlightenment; 3) Idealism as a 
“theory of progressive freedom in history”; 4) Marxism, and 
5) Capitalism. According to Lyotard, one can consider “the 
incredulity” towards these meta-narratives (méta-récits or 
grands récits) as postmodern. He points out that after Auschwitz 
it is impossible to speak of rationality and progress in Western 
history: In the twentieth century the Nazi genocide showed 
that history is not a continuous ethical progress towards the 
best. From the philosophical point of view the precursor of 
postmodern atmosphere is Friedrich Nietzsche. This German 
philosopher elaborated a radically anti-metaphysical thought 
and proposed an ethic of emancipation. Postmodernists refer 
to Nietzsche’s thought and theorize ethical-political practices 
aimed at the emancipation of women and socially weak 
subjects. Postmodernism’s rejection of “totalizing” theories 
with universal pretentions is complemented by positive 
celebration of diversity or “difference” and emphasis on the 
ethical demands of “the other”: this is, for example, the ethical 
perspective of Michel Foucault.
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37Valentini ETHICS AND POLITICS IN THE POSTMODERN CONDITION
Characteristics and varieties of postmodernism
Postmodernism is, at the same time, an aesthetic and a philosophical-political movement that 
characterizes our age.  So, postmodernism can be understood as a variety of skeptical, “anti-essentialist” 
and “anti-humanist” positions across a range of different disciplinary contexts from art, architecture 
and literature to social theory, philosophy and psychoanalysis. Hostility to the West’s “modernist” 
assumptions is driven by a series of historical events and developments. 
The twentieth-century horrors of world wars, totalitarianism, concentration camps and genocide, 
and a gradual relentless intellectual disillusionment with Marxism – understood as characteristic 
symptoms of “modernity” – are important sources of the “postmodern mood.” The exhaustion 
of artistic modernism provided a further and more literal impetus. Under the combined impact of 
these factors, the French philosophers Jean-François Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard have taken their 
leave from all “grand meta-narratives” of history, all universal claims to truth and any remaining faith 
in the Enlightenment project of rationalizing every aspect of live. Paradoxically, this philosophical 
postmodernism shades almost imperceptibly into a sociological and historically grounded account 
of postmodern thought and culture as expressions of the present state of  Western society. In both 
philosophical and sociological variants, however, postmodernism’s rejection of “totalizing” theories 
with universal pretentions is complemented by a positive celebration of diversity or “difference”, and 
an emphasis on the ethically indispensable but always elusive demands of “the other”. 
In this paper I try to underline the philosophical and social aspects of the “postmodern mood”.
With postmodernism, it is as if we pass through the looking-glass of  Western reason: in particular, the 
postmodern philosophers analyze and criticize the great claims of modern Western reason. 
They generally state ironically that what was previously most solid “melts into air” (1). Postmodernism 
attempts a radical break with all of the major strands of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thought. 
For postmodernists, both the orthodox Enlightenment “meta-narrative” of progress and emancipation, 
and the “speculative” narrative of Hegel and Marx have lost their explanatory force. Phenomenology 
(of Edmund Husserl) and existentialism (of Jean-Paul Sartre) are condemned as varieties of humanism 
or nostalgic philosophies of the subject.  As we shall see, Michel Foucault’s thought anticipated many 
aspects of postmodernism and is a form of anti-humanism.
According to many authors,  it is impossible to provide a straightforward definition of postmodernism. 
Not only are there conflicting views about what postmodernism is, but postmodernist positions are 
also adopted within a variety of disciplinary settings. There is a wide range of contexts for what are 
nevertheless related discourses of modernity and postmodernity. These include history and sociology, 
philosophy, art and art theory, as well as literature and literary criticism.
Postmodernism: four distinct but interrelated contexts of formation
 
According to David West, the genealogy of postmodernist thought involves at least four distinct 
but interrelated contexts of formation (2).
The artistic movement
In the first place, postmodernism is an artistic movement that was born in reaction to (rational) 
modernism and is usually located in the 1960s.  Architecture was the first medium to exhibit clear 
postmodernist tendencies. These include eclecticism, ambiguity and plasticity of the forms.
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In contrast to artistic modernism, which affirms the quasi-religious significance of art, 
postmodernism rejects any absolute distinction between high and low culture, between art 
and entertainment. Walter Benjamin’s germinal essay on the Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction (1936) is thus an important clue to the understanding of artistic postmodernity. 
Benjamin discusses the disruption of the “aura” of the great work of art as a result of the 
easy availability of copies produced by techniques of mechanical reproduction such as printing, 
photography and sound recording. Artistic postmodernism can be seen as the outcome of this 
levelling and demystifying tendency (even though Benjamin foresaw a different outcome), which 
has been reinforced by the extensive role of communications and information technology in 
contemporary societies. 
Silvio Gaggi also identifies the “epistemological skepticism” as key features of artistic 
postmodernity. Einstein’s relativity theory and quantum mechanics, notably in the form of 
Heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle”, undermine both notions of absolute space and time and 
deterministic interpretations of causality. According to Gaggi, artistic and scientific tendencies 
contribute to both the mood of uncertainty and flux, and the greater openness to non-Western 
cultures and worldviews, which is characteristic of postmodernism (3).
The fascism and the nazi genocide
A second important context for the formation of postmodernism, however, is provided 
by the history of Europe and the West in the twentieth century. This history includes two 
unprecedentedly destructive world wars, the rise of fascism in Germany, Italy and Spain, 
and a protracted “Cold  War” maintained by balanced nuclear terror of “mutually assured 
destruction”. In the meantime, the colonial mission of modern and “enlightened” European 
nations to civilize “barbarian” neighbors has lost conviction. Former colonies have been 
relinquished to movements of national liberation and the atrocities of former colonial 
regimes widely recognized. Most horrifying, the Nazi genocide of more than six million Jews, 
communists, homosexuals,  gypsies and disabled people (and many others) dealt a fatal blow 
to any complacent reading of  Western history as the privileged site of civilization. Erroneously 
the West saw itself as the embodiment of progress and the very antithesis of barbarism. In 
Germany, one of Europe’s most economically developed, artistically cultured and philosophically 
creative nations, there had emerged a regime. But the Holocaust is shocking not, or not simply, 
as an atavistic lapse from the path of progress and Enlightenment, but rather as a demonstration 
of dangers intrinsic to modernity itself.  As Hannah  Arendt, Theodor  Adorno and Jean-François 
Lyotard have highlighted, the Holocaust was a very modern affair. The genocide of six million 
people was carefully planned, administered with bureaucracy and carried out with considerable 
technological inventiveness. In Zygmunt Bauman’s words: “The Holocaust was a unique encounter 
between the old tensions which modernity ignored, slighted or failed to resolve – and the powerful 
instruments of rational and effective action that modern development itself brought into being” (4). 
The combined effect of these catastrophic events of recent European history, from imperialistic 
slaughter to Nazi genocide, is thus a dual challenge to the West’s self-conscious modernity. Is 
modernity a secure achievement of the West? Is modernity really an achievement at all?
From these criticisms of modern reason and its totalitarian consequences many authors (as 
Lyotard, Foucault and Jacques Derrida) propose an “ethics of the other” and a “politics of 
difference”.
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The collapse of communist regimes and the end of ideologies
Another important episode from this historical period provides a third context for the 
formation of postmodernism, but one that is, this time, both historical and intellectual in nature. 
This is the fate of Marxism. It is also in the twentieth century, after all, that Marxism completed 
its evolution from theory to practice, becoming the official ideology of a number of “actually 
existing” socialist regimes (5). In the twentieth century we saw the bureaucratization of the 
socialist idea and the Stalinization of the Soviet Union; we saw party purges, “show-trials”, 
massacres and the “gulag” of prison camps under Stalin, the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956 
and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe since 1989 has eroded any remaining confidence in the Marxist project. We can say that 
Chinese communism survives only by dint of a combination of market reforms and repression. 
Intellectual disillusionment has been particularly marked in France. In post-war France, Marxism was 
not only a powerful political force, it also dominated the intellectual scene in a way unparalleled 
in most other Western countries. Louis  Althusser’s structuralist Marxism exerted considerable 
influence for a number of years. Even within existentialism and phenomenology, Marxist theory 
was influential. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir were aligned with 
the revolutionary left for much of their careers. They were all, at various times, members of the 
French Communist Party. Besides, an intellectual such as Roger Garaudy was secretary of the party; 
Lyotard and Baudrillard belonged to a variety of Marxist grouping; Foucault was a member of the 
French Communist Party, albeit only for a short time.  Against this political tendency of many French 
intellectuals, the liberal sociologist Raymond Aron wrote, in 1955, his famous book  The Opium of 
the Intellectuals (6).This background is important because Marxism is arguably the most frequent, if not 
always the most explicit, target of postmodernist critics of modernism. Warnings about the dangers of 
“totalizing” theory as well as skepticism about the unfounded pretentions of the philosophy of history 
are most plausibly read as references to Marxism. For intellectuals who regarded Marxism as the best 
available response to this more liberal Enlightenment, it is not surprising that Marxism’s failure is taken as 
final proof of the bankruptcy of the Enlightenment project and modernism.  As the American sociologist 
Daniel Bell wrote, we are at the “end of ideology”, i.e., the end of the great philosophical account of 
history (7).  As we can also see with Lyotard, postmodernism rejects all philosophies of history and 
provides a radical challenge to the most basic categories of  Western philosophy and metaphysics.  
The philosophical thought after Nietzsche and Heidegger: the deconstruction of Western 
metaphysics
Postmodernism defines itself by its rejection of  any  commitment  to modernity or Enlightenment, 
including the dialectic of Hegel and Marx. It is here that anti-humanism (i.e. anti-anthropocentrism) 
and the critique of the subject, from Nietzsche and Heidegger to structuralism and post-
structuralism, play a decisive role in preparing the ground for a more radical break with the 
Enlightenment project. In particular, in the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
we find an anticipation of postmodernism’s ideas (8). He denies that metaphysics is possible and 
theorizes the age of nihilism; furthermore, he assumes a loss of faith in God and in the immortality 
of the soul (“God is dead”, and religious values are false). Nietzsche makes use of an idea that 
derives from Heraclitus in his notion of the “eternal return” (ewige Wiederkunft) of things.  After 
all possible combinations of the elements of the world have been realized, there is an interval 
of a previously undetermined duration, and then the cycle begins again, and so on, indefinitely. 
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 According to Nietzsche, everything that happens in the world repeats itself in identical fashion time 
and again. Everything returns eternally, including everything that is evil, miserable and vile. But men 
can transform the world and themselves by means of transmutation of all values (Umwertung aller 
Werte), and can progress toward becoming supermen (Übermensch). Thus Nietzsche’s affirmation of 
life is not limited to one’s accepting and wishing to live only once, but an infinite number of times. 
Nietzsche is opposed to all the equalitarian, humanistic and democratic trends of his age. He is a 
champion of mighty personalities. The highest good is life itself, which culminates in the will of power 
(Wille zur Macht). Man must go beyond himself and become something superior to man, just as man 
is superior to the monkey: this is the theory of the superman. Nietzsche models his superman on 
unscrupulous and immoral Renaissance personalities who nevertheless had gigantic capacities for 
life and who were strong, impulsive and energetic (for example, The Prince of Machiavelli). 
Nietzsche is particularly hostile to the Kantian ethics of duty, and also to Christian morality. He 
values only the strong, impulsive life which has the will to dominate. This represents good, whereas 
weakness, sickness and failure are evil. Compassion is the greatest evil. Thus Nietzsche distinguishes 
two types of morality. The morality of the masters is that of powerful individuals of superior 
vitality; this morality applies only to these superior beings and is based on the exigency and on the 
affirmation of vital impulses. In contrast, the morality of the slaves is that of weak and miserable 
people, of degenerates; it is governed by lack of confidence in life and the respect for compassion, 
humility, patience, and the like. Nietzsche says that it is a morality of resentment, which opposes 
everything that is superior and which therefore affirms every form of equalitarianism. Nietzsche 
attributes this character of resentment to Christian morality.
We can therefore understand the reasons why the thought of Nietzsche has been a point of 
reference for the totalitarian culture (above all Nazism) and for the postmodernism. Nazism 
referred to Nietzsche’s ideal of the superman. Martin Heidegger and postmodern philosophers 
referred to Nietzsche’s criticisms of  Western metaphysics (9). We have to say that also the German 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas, in his book The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, examines at 
some length Nietzsche’s influence on “postmodern thought.” He shows in which way Nietzsche’s 
aesthetic mode of world interpretation became of central importance for Heidegger’s and Derrida’s 
critique of the Enlightenment, and for Bataille’s and Foucault’s attempts to deconstruct reason. 
Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and his “genealogical” subversion of the language of “good and evil” by 
means of a theory of power, introduce into contemporary discourse, so Habermas, the seductive 
idea of an “unmasking critique of reason that sets itself outside the horizon of reason” (10). So 
Habermas describes Nietzsche’s thought, in a critical way, as the “turning point” to postmodernity.
   
Jean-François Lyotard: the postmodern as the end of “meta-narratives” 
of the west
The term “postmodernism” first entered the philosophical lexicon in 1979, with the publication 
of The Postmodern Condition by the French intellectual Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998). 
During his career, Lyotard occupied a variety of political positions ranging from Marxism and 
“spontaneist” anarchism to his later identification with the “mood” of postmodernity.
Lyotard describes postmodernity as a “condition” or “mood” that corresponds to the present 
stage of “postindustrial society.” Postmodernity is, therefore, a sign of the obsolescence of 
modernity. Lyotard defines modernity in terms of the role played in Western societies since 
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the Enlightenment by “meta-narratives” for the legitimation of both science and state.  A meta-
narrative in Lyotard’s sense is equivalent to a philosophy of history. The contingent events of 
history are understood in terms of an all-inclusive narrative, which is supposed to encapsulate 
“the” meaning of history. The reliance on legitimating meta-narratives is to “the choice called 
the Occident” (11). 
Lyotard proceeds to list a number of forms which meta-narratives (méta-récits or grands récits) can 
take. In particular, he speaks about five large meta-narratives of Western culture: 1) Christianity 
(understood also in secularized form that its values have taken into modernity);  2) Enlightenment; 
3) Idealism; 4) Marxism, and 5) Capitalism.  According to Lyotard, one can consider “the incredulity” 
towards these meta-narratives as postmodern. Clearly these “ideologies” or “philosophies of 
history” are theories of social progress and modernization. He points out that after Auschwitz 
it is impossible to speak of rationality and progress in Western history: the horrible experience 
in the death camps have shown that history does not work any rational project, as Marx and 
Hegel’s dialectic wanted to show (12).
Postmodernism is skepticism about all philosophy of history, all claims to foresee the inevitable 
goal of history and all political ideologies which promise to lead us to that goal. There is even 
skepticism about the universal validity of the values that define a particular historical future 
as good or bad. The “death of God” announced by Nietzsche is closely followed by the death 
of history and progress. There is even a loss of faith in anything other than the instrumental 
effectiveness of  Western rationality. We can say that the Enlightenment project has fallen victim 
to its own skeptical onslaught against religious dogma, tradition and authority.
If the mood of postmodernity is defined in terms of incredulity towards meta-narratives, the 
politics of postmodernity is radically anti-authoritarian. The skeptical mood of postmodernity 
is also intolerant of grand projects and ambitious political programmes, which are a prominent 
feature of modern states and ideologies.  Attempts to unify society artificially according to 
some grand “totalizing” theory or ideology are no longer convincing. Even more clearly, the 
consequences of such attempts have often been disastrous.  The twentieth century witnessed 
unlimited global wars, bureaucratically organized genocide, as well as fascist and Stalinist 
totalitarianism.
Totalitarianism, for Lyotard and other postmodernists (as the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo), 
is perhaps the quintessential expression of the modernist search for unity and order. Instead, 
society should be recognized as a “heterogeneity of language games” or “institutions in patches”. 
Far from being susceptible to theorizing in the unifying style of Newtonian mechanics, society 
consists of “clouds of sociality” more amenable to a “pragmatics of language particles”. With 
the demise of totalizing theories of society, the value or even viability of centralized state 
politics is also brought in doubt. The (central) state cannot deal with the irreducible complexity 
of contemporary society except by restoring to the totalitarian imposition of unity and order. 
For the mood of postmodernity, “consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value” (13). 
Only the diversity and heterogeneity of social and cultural forms can resist the invasive modernist 
spirit of “totality”. It follows that only temporary and local consensus is desirable, only provisional 
contracts should be sought.  We can say that postmodernism intensifies the democratic impulses, 
ensuring respect for the diversity of viewpoints and their right to a voice. Postmodernist principles 
provide strong arguments for democratic institutions, including the mechanisms capable of 
preventing absolute state power and civil associations beyond the state.
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Michel Foucault:  the genealogy of the subject and the birth of biopolitics
The thought of Michel Foucault anticipated many themes of postmodernism: the critique of 
Western metaphysics, the rejection of Hegel’s dialectic and historicism, the will for the political 
emancipation of citizens, a “microphysics of power”. We can say that his ideal masters were the 
so-called masters of suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. He coined the terms “biopower/
biopolitics” with which he referred to the practices of modern nations and their regulation of their 
subjects through “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation 
of bodies and the control of populations” (14).
Michel Foucault (1926-1984) studied in Paris at the École Normale Supérieure, where he obtained 
licences in philosophy and psychology, before passing the agrégation de philosophie in 1951. He 
taught at the University of  Tunis, returning to Paris after the events of May 1968 to become Head 
of the Philosophy Department at the University of Paris VIII (Vincennes). In 1969 he was elected 
to the Collège de France, where he chose for his chair the title of Professor of the History of 
Thought. He lectured widely in North America, Brazil, and Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Throughout this period Foucault was active in a number of political movements, including the 
Groupe d’information sur les prisons, and protests in support of the radical newspapers Libération, 
immigrant workers, and gay liberation. He also took part in anti-racist campaigns and various 
actions on behalf of Soviet dissidents and the Solidarity movement in Poland (15).
Foucault’s distinctive approach to the history of “systems of thought” relies upon his concept of 
discourse, which he defines in terms of rules governing the production of statements in a given 
empirical field at a given time. The study of these rules forms the basis of his “archaeology of 
knowledge” (archéologie du savoir). He also developed a distinctive genealogical approach to the 
history of particular formations of knowledge and power such as criminality, sexuality, and forms 
of governmentality. These govern not only the ways in which power is exercised over individuals or 
groups, but also the way in which subjects of delinquency, sexuality, or government are constituted. 
Finally, he outlines a distinctive concept of ethics understood in terms of kinds of techniques and 
relation to the self through which individuals govern their own behavior and make themselves into 
certain kinds of ethical subjects.
Micro-physics of power, bio-power and governmentality
 As we said, Foucault accepts the critical implication of the decentring of the subject effected by 
both the Marxist theory of ideology and Freudian psychoanalysis, which unmask the subject as the 
formed and deformed product of social and psychological conditions.
According to him, it is necessary to break irrevocably with the humanist conception of the subject. 
Furthermore, Foucault’s anti-humanism – like that of Louis Althusser, one of Foucault’s teachers 
at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris – is explicitly political. According to one of his many 
programmatic statements, the objective of his work “has been to create a history of the different 
models, by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects,” (16) subjects in the sense of 
“subjection” to the authority and power.
Foucault is Nietzschean above all in his conviction that power and knowledge are really two sides 
of the same coin: “Power and knowledge directly imply one another”.  He sometimes even speaks 
of “power/knowledge as an invisible amalgam” (17). 
According to Nietzsche and Foucault, knowledge is always the relative and questionable 
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expression of a particular constellation of relations of power and force. On the other hand, “the 
exercise of power is accompanied or paralleled by the production of apparatuses of knowledge” 
(18). The exercise of power requires knowledge. In Barry Smart’s words: “Knowledge is not 
neutral or objective but rather is a product of power relations. In other words, knowledge is 
political in the sense that its conditions of existence or possibility include power relations” 
(19). The symbiotic relationship between power and knowledge is,  as we shall see, at the 
heart of Foucault’s account of parallel emergence in modern societies of human sciences as 
“disciplines”. He calls this kind of power “disciplinary power”.
With Foucault’s return to Nietzsche, the concept of power is placed at the centre of his 
analysis, and it is important for him to avoid any misunderstanding of its nature. He contests 
a number of common assumptions that, in his view, tend to blind us to the multifarious 
manifestations and devious stratagems of power. In the first place, we should not be limited 
by a “juridical” view, which sees power only in the negative, prohibitive functions of a 
repressive state apparatus, law and police. This view is rendered obsolete by the increasingly 
positive and productive deployment of power in modern society. Other aspects of the 
juridical view obscure the nature of this deployment. Power is seen a something that is 
possessed and consciously exercised by an agent or group of agents over others in order 
to further its own interests. But power is not a thing that can be possessed or owned in 
the way such models require. Foucault is unwilling to reify power in this way, preferring to 
speak of “power relation” rather than “power” in order to emphasize that power is not 
a thing but a mode of interaction: “Power exists only when it is put into action” (20). 
Nor can power relations be traced to a single underlying mechanism or source such as 
capitalism or the ruling class. Power constitutes a much broader and more diffuse field than 
such theories (like modern liberalisms) imply. Nor, finally, is it correct to assume that power 
always involves straightforwardly “binary” or “top-down” relations. Power is not “a propriety 
located at the summit of the social order employed in a descending direction over and 
throughout the entire social domain” (21).
Relationships of domination exercised by one group over another (for example, by 
the bourgeoisie over the proletariat or by men over women) are predicated on more 
finely grained and multidirectional relations of power and resistance  at  the  “micro-
level” of society.  Accordingly, social explanation should give priority to this micro-
level: in this regard Foucault speaks explicitly of a “microphysics of power”. In Alan 
Sheridan’s words: “It is a matter of examining how the techniques and procedures 
of power operating routinely at the level of everyday life have been appropriated or 
engaged by more general power or economic interests rather than the converse” (22). 
Foucault’s more constructive remarks about the emergence of new forms of power in 
Western societies illuminate these rather abstract critical points. He is particularly interested 
in what he calls the “threshold of modernity”: the transition from the “classical age” of the 
seventeenth century to the “modern world” is inaugurated with the French Revolution of 
1789. Characteristic of this period is a double operation of power, by which the “repressive 
hypothesis” implicit in the juridical conception of power as exclusively prohibitive diverts 
attention from power’s more productive activities. This is significant because, to the extent 
that we are unaware of these activities, we are less able to resist them: “Power as a pure limit 
set on freedom, is, at least in our society, the general form of its acceptability” (23). 
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The repressive hypothesis is increasingly functional to the operations of power as the more 
exclusively repressive, “classical” mode of government, symbolized in the sovereign’s “power 
of life and death” over the subject, is gradually replaced by the productive management of 
individuals and people, which Foucault calls “bio-power”, e.g. “power of the life (bios)”. Regimes 
become “managers of life and survival, of bodies and race: “What might be called a society’s 
‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own 
political strategies” (24). The rise of bio-power is also associated with the spread of racist 
theories in the nineteenth century.
The deployment of bio-power involves a series of transformations in the nature of what 
Foucault calls “governmentality”. This term refers to an increasingly autonomous “governmental 
rationality”, developed since the Renaissance alongside the narrower raison d’état first in 
Machiavelli’s The Prince (25).  An important contribution to the emergence of distinctively 
modern forms of governmentality is made by a number of discourses on the “science of police 
or policy”, written from the seventeenth century onwards.  Although police and “policy” are now 
words normally associated with straightforwardly repressive functions of the state, Foucault 
reminds us of the originally much broader meaning. 
Early discussions of policing concerned a lot more than law and order in the contemporary 
sense. They dealt with nothing less than the welfare of the population as a whole, and so helped 
to formulate a distinctively “pastoral” conception of power. The centralizing and bureaucratizing 
tendencies of modern societies have often been highlighted, for example by Max Weber and 
theorists associated with the Frankfurt School. However, for Foucault what is particularly novel 
about pastoral power is its attention not just to the state of community as a whole, but to each 
individual in particular and in detail throughout the course of his or her life. The “individualizing” 
attention of pastoral power is inspired by the example of the Catholic Church, which, through 
the confessional and other techniques, develops “a knowledge of the conscience and an ability 
to direct it” (26).  Adapting such techniques, modern states apply a similarly pastoral, and 
similarly intrusive, attention to the health, wealth and welfare of their populations.
As Foucault’s conception of “power/knowledge” would lead us to expect, the rise of pastoral 
power fosters a new knowledge of “man.” It is no surprise, then, that the threshold of modernity 
also sees the emergence of a number of new disciplines within the humanities and social 
sciences: statistical disciplines of economics, demography, epidemiology and sociology. Typically, 
these describe general laws governing the normal behavior of the population as a whole; in 
fact, they give rise to the notions of population and normality as we understand them. These 
disciplines enhance the state’s ability to control and care for the health of its population, to 
ensure adequate human resources for its military activities, to promote economic growth and 
so on. But pastoral power also requires detailed and systematic knowledge of individuals and, 
consequently, a radical break with the Aristotelian view of knowledge as exclusively concerned 
with the generality of genus and species. The more individualizing disciplines of medicine, 
psychiatry, psychoanalysis and education study individuals in all their potential eccentricity. 
Thus, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes how, with the emergence of modern prison, 
“a specific mode of subjection was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a 
discourse with a ‘scientific’ status” (27). Similarly, the clinic and the asylum were sites for the 
development of modern medicine and psychiatry. 
As these examples suggest, though, pastoral power is not purely a matter of knowledge but 
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involves, in addition, a range of unmistakably material practices and interventions. These take 
two principal forms: the global “regulatory controls” of a “bio-politics of the population” and 
an individualizing “discipline” or “anatomo-politics of the body”. It is the latter modality of 
pastoral power that is most interesting and distinctively modern.  Alongside the emergence of 
human sciences there is an unprecedented expansion of disciplinary practices, deployed by both 
state and non-state institutions (in some cases initiated variously by “do-gooders”, reformers, 
helpful doctors or concerned aristocrats). Disciplinary power is directed primarily at the body; 
it is designed to produce “subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies” (28). But at the 
same time it aims at psychological effects. In Barry Smart’s words: “Discipline is a power which 
infiltrates the very body and psyche of the individual. Which transforms the life and time of the 
individual into labour-power, that property essential to the capitalist mode of production” (29). 
A variety of techniques are developed to this end, including detailed schedules and timetables, 
exercises and training, examinations, report-keeping, isolation of inmates and so on. Emblematic 
of such practices is Bentham’s Panopticon, which Foucault describes as an “architectural 
figure” of disciplinary power. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) designed a prison building with 
individual cells radiating from a central observation point, ensuring the permanent visibility of 
the inmates to the warder but their complete invisibility to one another. In Foucault’s words, 
the Panopticon is a way of “arranging spatial unities” in order “to induce in the inmate a state 
of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (30). 
As this example also makes clear, in the modern period there is a “reversal of visibility” 
between sovereign and subject. The focus of attention is no longer the sovereign but the humble 
individual, who is the object of an ever intensifying surveillance. Similar disciplinary techniques 
are developed in a range of “carceral” institutions modeled on the prison (in schools, hospitals, 
asylums, factories and barracks), all concerned with “increasing the utility of individuals”. These 
characteristically modern institutions are not so much humane products of a more enlightened 
and rational age as more efficient and more intrusive instruments of an expansive power. 
The constitution of the subject as an object of disciplinary practices and objectifying disciplines 
is, however, only half the story.  Of equal significance for the genealogy of modern subjectivity is 
a parallel series of processes, constituting the individual subject as subject, (“subjection” to the 
authority and disciplinary power). Thus Foucault’s history of sexuality traces the emergence of 
a series of discourses and practices that are designed to make the subject more reliably and 
extensively responsible for itself. The explosion of discourses on sexuality in the nineteenth 
century, with their minute attention to the details of “perverse” sexual variation from the 
norm, is related to the emergent bio-politics of population, but it also contributes to the 
more intimate constitution of the subject as subject. Important episodes in this story are 
the Catholic confessional, Freudian psychoanalysis and the promotion of “sexuality” from a 
relatively unimportant fact about bodies to something decisive for the individual’s sense of 
identity. Foucault’s analysis implies a critique of the “depth hermeneutics” practiced in different 
ways in both psychoanalysis and the confession. The deep truths about the mind or the soul 
which these practices of patient interrogation are supposed to uncover really function as 
instances of power. Far from uncovering some hidden meaning or truth, they inscribe in the 
subject “truths” they themselves produce. In the process, the subject is enticed into assuming 
responsibility for more and more regions of his or her life.
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“Ethics of the other” and “politics of difference”
Foucault’s account of power has radical implications for political theory and practice. In particular, 
it undermines any “totalizing theory” which, like Marxism, seeks to unify the diversity of social and 
historical events within a single explanatory framework. Theorizing the complex field of relations 
of power as an organized totality is a strategy which, even in the hands of critical intellectuals or 
socialist militants, contributes inevitably to the reproduction of domination. As the experience of 
bureaucratic state socialism demonstrates, rulers rely on totalizing theories in order to legitimate 
their authority and exercise power more effectively. During conversations with his friend and 
colleague Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) (31), Foucault intimates a less authoritarian role for theory. 
Just as relations of power are complex and dispersed, so should resistance be multicentred and 
diverse. The multiplicity of power relations requires an equally multifarious resistance to instance 
of power, which can nonetheless be conceived as interconnected or as a network. 
In Sheridan’s words: “Because ‘power’ is multiple and ubiquitous, the struggle against it must be 
localized. Equally, however, because it is a network and not a collection of isolated points, each 
localized struggle induces effects on the entire network. Struggle cannot be totalized – a single, 
centralized, hierarchized organization setting out to seize a single, centralized, hierarchized power; 
but it can be serial, in terms of horizontal links between one point of struggle and another” (32). 
Similarly, social and political theory should be a “local and regional practice”. Rather than a single 
“master” theory, there should be a plurality of theories engaging with power at different points and 
to different ends. The proper stance of the intellectual is also revised: «The intellectual’s role is no 
longer to place himself “somewhat ahead and to the side” in order to express the stifled truth of 
collectivity; rather it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and 
instrument in the sphere of “knowledge”, “truth”, “consciousness”, and “discourse”» (33). 
Intellectuals should not put themselves forward as representatives of the people or vanguard 
of the proletariat. They should be authors of “politics of difference, diversity and autonomous 
organizations”. Examples of these types of intellectuals are Judith Butler (a disciple of Foucault), 
Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigary: in particular, they attempt to understand women in their irreducible 
difference. They are feminist and theorize woman from a woman’s point of view in order to discover 
a “feminine feminine”, and so overcome a long tradition of regarding woman as a lack, as deficient 
and subordinate other of man. They seek to liberate “the feminine from male philosophical thought”: 
therefore they are critical of the ways in which psychoanalysis and philosophy universalize an 
essentially male representation of humanity. Because language, society and culture are all constituted 
on the basis of this false universalization of male perspectives, interests and desires, women can 
only gain full representation by means of thoroughgoing social reconstruction. On the basis of the 
political thought of Foucault, they criticize Western culture and present themselves as intellectuals 
of “rupture, renovation and revolution” (34).
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